

## Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/S:DKEOGH:

APPROVED BY S:AHUGHTON

AF:RMMOOSE

AF:WBEDMONDSON

IO:GHELMAN

S/P:ALAKE

P:GMOOSE

S/S-O:RCASTRODALE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1. 3

TAGS: PDEV, RH, US, UK

SUBJECT: RHODESIA: BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN VISIT

TO WASHINGTON

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REF: STATE 060429

SUMMARY: DURING ONE-DAY VISIT TO WASHINGTON, MARCH 8,

OWEN MET PRIVATELY WITH THE SECRETARY, AND THEN WITH  
THE PRESIDENT FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES TO DISCUSS RHODESIA.

FOLLOWING THAT MEETING, OWEN MET FOR SEVERAL HOURS WITH  
SECRETARY VANCE, TONY LAKE (S/P), DICK MOOSE (AF), IO  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HELMAN, AF DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY EDMONDSON, AND OTHERS, TO DISCUSS THE RHODESIAN  
SITUATION. OWEN WAS ACCCOMPANIED BY JOHNNY GRAHAM, HAM

WHYTE, EWEN FERGUSON, AND STEVEN WALL, AS WELL AS  
MINISTER JOHN ROBINSON FROM UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON. THE  
FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE DISCUSSION AT THAT MEETING.  
THE KEY DECISION WAS THAT THE BRITISH AND THE US WOULD  
JOINTLY SOUND OUT PRESIDENT NYERERE AND BRAND FOURIE ON  
THE IDEA CALLING A MEETING OF ALL PARTIES TO THE  
RHODESIAN CONFLICT FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRIDGING DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. SECRETARY VANCE BEGAN THE MEETING ASKING OWEN'S  
ADVICE ON HOW TO HANDLE MEETINGS WITH NKOMO AND MUGABE.  
IT WAS AGREED THAT OWEN AND VANCE WOULD NOT SEE THE  
PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS TOGETHER BECAUSE A JOINT US/UK  
MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD SEEM TO BE A  
CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE AAP. MR. MOOSE  
SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR MR. VANCE TO SEE  
NKOMO AND MUGABE BY HIMSELF, ON THE RATIONALE THAT THEY  
WERE IN THE UNITED STATES AND HE WANTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE  
OF THAT OPPORTUNITY.

2. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF A MEETING AMONG ALL THE  
NATIONALIST PARTIES TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A RHODESIAN  
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SOLUTION, SECRETARY VANCE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE  
SOONER WE MOVED ON SETTING UP SUCH A CONFERENCE, THE  
BETTER. OWEN AGREED SAYING HE WAS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. OWEN ASKED WHAT OUR NEXT STEP  
WOULD BE: SHOULD WE GO DIRECTLY TO SMITH AND THE SOUTH  
AFRICANS? SECRETARY VANCE ASKED IF WE WANTED THE SOUTH  
AFRICANS TO WEIGH IN WITH SMITH ON THE IMPORTANCE OF  
ATTENDING SUCH A MEETING. OWEN AGREED, AND THEN TURNED  
TO THE QUESTION OF WHERE AND HOW SUCH A MEETING MIGHT  
BE ARRANGED. HE SUGGESTED A PROXIMITY FORMULA.

3. MR. VANCE ASKED ABOUT SETTING UP A CONFERENCE IN  
NEW YORK. OWEN AGREED THAT MIGHT BE BEST, AND VANCE  
SAID THAT WE HAD A GOOD REASON FOR IT SINCE THE NATIONALIST  
PARTIES WERE IN NEW YORK. GRAHAM RAISED THE PROBLEM  
THAT MIGHT BE CAUSED FOR THE USG IF IAN SMITH WERE TO  
APPEAR ON NEW YORK TELEVISION, AND MOOSE POINTED OUT  
THAT NKOMO HAD SAID HE MIGHT HAVE TO LEAVE THE UNITED  
STATES MARCH 9.

4. TURNING TO THE BASIS FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE, MOOSE  
SAID HE WANTED TO CLARIFY OUR PURPOSE. WOULD WE TRY TO  
BUILD ON THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, TO TRY TO GET AT  
LEAST NKOMO INTO IT? COULD IT BE IMPROVED SO AS TO GET  
NKOMO IN? OWEN SAID NYERERE HAD SUGGESTED WE TRY TO  
"MARRY" THE INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE AAP. HE  
THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID SAYING WE WERE BUILDING  
ON EITHER THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT OR THE AAP. WE MIGHT

BE TRYING TO MARRY THE TWO SOLUTIONS, BUT IT WOULD NOT  
BE WISE TO SAY SO PUBLICLY.

5. VANCE RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE PROBLEM THAT  
MIGHT BE CAUSED BY HAVING MR. SMITH IN NEW YORK. WHAT  
DOMESTIC PROBLEMS MIGHT THIS CAUSE US? WHAT PROBLEMS  
WOULD IT CAUSE WITH THE FRONT LINE REPRESENTATIVES IN  
NEW YORK? LAKE REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE MORE OF THE  
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LATTER, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT A MEETING COULD BE HELD  
OUTSIDE THE UN CONTEXT BUT IN NEW YORK. LAKE ADDED  
THAT IF THE CONFERENCE WERE NOT BASED EITHER ON THE AAP  
OR THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, BUT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF  
THE AAP, THIS WOULD GIVE THE FRONT LINE SOME FLEXIBILITY  
IN REACTING TO THE SUGGESTION FOR THE CONFERENCE.  
MOOSE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD GIVE NKOMO SOME  
FLEXIBILITY AS WELL.

6. EDMONDSON RAISED A PROBLEM WHICH HAD BEDEVILED THE  
GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS: SMITH'S CLAIM TO BE PRIME MINISTER  
OF A RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT. OWEN SAID WE SHOULD AVOID  
RAISING GENEVA, BUT SHOULD OFFER AN INVITATION TO ALL  
THE PARTIES FROM THE MALTA AND SALISBURY TALKS. WHO  
WOULD COME FROM MALTA OR SALISBURY WOULD BE THEIR OWN  
AFFAIR. AT GENEVA HE SAID THE BRITISH SHOULD HAVE  
TURNED ASIDE ARGUMENTS OVER PETTY ISSUES SUCH AS NAME  
PLATES AND TITLES AND THREATENED TO BREAK OFF THE  
CONFERENCE IF SUCH ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. HE LAMENTED  
THAT IVOR RICHARD HAD NOT BEEN SENT THERE WITH SUFFICIENT  
CLOUT TO DO THAT.

7. MR. VANCE SUGGESTED THAT A LOCATION SUCH AS ARDEN  
HOUSE, ONE HOUR OUTSIDE NEW YORK, WOULD OFFER ENOUGH  
PRIVACY TO AVOID THAT PROBLEM. OWEN SUGGESTED THAT  
PROXIMITY TALKS WOULD ALSO AVOID SUCH A PROBLEM AND  
SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT START ON THAT BASIS.

8. MOOSE AGREED THAT BEGINNING WITH PROXIMITY TALKS  
WAS AN EXCELLENT IDEA. IF A SITUATION FOLLOWED IN  
WHICH WE WERE NEGOTIATING WITH PARTIES AT SOME DISTANCE,  
THIS MIGHT OFFER A WAY OUT OF PROBLEMS AT THE UNITED  
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NATIONS. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS THE WAY TO PROCEED UNLESS  
WE BELIEVED WE COULD HOLD ALL THE PARTIES TOGETHER IN  
NEW YORK LONG ENOUGH TO GET AGREEMENT. HE SUGGESTED A  
ROUND IN NEW YORK AND THEN A LATER ROUND AT SOME NEUTRAL  
AFRICAN LOCALE SUCH AS KENYA. GRAHAM SAID THAT THERE  
WERE NO NEUTRAL AFRICAN SPOTS.

9. SECRETARY VANCE THEN CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO HOLD THE MEETING IN NEW YORK CITY SINCE WE HAD MOST OF THE PARTIES THERE AND HAD THEIR ATTENTION. LAKE SAID SMITH COULD COME BUT MIGHT NOT WANT TO COME TO NEW YORK. HE COULD SEND A DELEGATION HOWEVER.

10. OWEN THEN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO DISCUSSION OF A DRAFT INVITATION WHICH THE BRITISH HAD PREPARED WHICH WOULD INVITE ALL THE PARTIES TO THE MALTA AND SALISBURY TALKS TO A MEETING WHICH COULD GIVE EFFECT TO COMMON

OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING INDEPENDENCE FOR ZIMBABWE IN 1978; A NEW GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE, IN CONDITIONS THAT WILL PERMIT FREE, FAIR ELECTIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THE DRAFT WAS MODIFIED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT. FORMULA FOR INVITATION TO NEW RHODESIAN CONFERENCE. IT IS COMMON GROUND THAT: (A) ZIMBABWE SHOULD BECOME INDEPENDENT IN 1978; (B) THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE SHOULD BE ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE; (C) ELECTIONS MUST BE HELD IN CONDITIONS THAT WILL PERMIT THEM TO BE CONDUCTED FREELY AND FAIRLY. ACCORDINGLY, THE BRITISH AND US GOVERNMENTS, WHO ON 1 SEPTEMBER PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO GIVE EFFECT TO THESE PRINCIPLES, INVITE ALL THE PARTIES TO THE MALTA AND SALISBURY TALKS TO MEET WITH A VIEW TO WIDENING THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND ESTABLISHING AN ACCEPTABLE MACHINERY FOR ACHIEVING THESE COMMON OBJECTIVES. END TEXT.

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11. LAKE RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE FRONT LINE SHOULD BE INVITED OR NOT. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD WANT THEM THERE. LAKE POINTED OUT THAT WITHOUT PRESSURE FROM THE FRONT LINE, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD ATTEND. GRAHAM SAID THAT THE FRONT LINE WANTED A CONFERENCE, BUT SECRETARY VANCE POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS ON THE BASIS OF THE AAP. OWEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE FORMULA WOULD ALLOW PREM CHAND OR LORD CARVER TO ATTEND. VANCE AGREED SAYING THAT THEY HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE MALTA TALKS.

12. OWEN SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR SMITH TO ATTEND IF THE INVITATION WERE BASED ON THE TEXT OF THE AAP. VANCE SAID HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD TRY THIS INVITATION AND SEE IF THEY WOULD BUY IT. OWEN SAID THE BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT SMITH WON'T ACCEPT SIMPLY HANDING OVER TO THE BRITISH. ON THE OTHER HAND, NKOMO WANTS TO BE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND WANTS SMITH OUT. SOME KIND OF AN ARRANGEMENT LIKE

THAT MIGHT BE MADE TO WORK, ALTHOUGH BISHOP MUZOREWA  
WOULD NOT LIKE IT. OWEN INSISTED THAT SMITH WOULD NOT  
ACCEPT REIMPOSITION OF UK AUTHORITY. SMITH DID NOT  
WANT A LARGE UN FORCE EITHER, BUT COULD TAKE UN OBSERVERS  
AND A UN MISSION.

13. OWEN SAID THAT NKOMO SIMPLY BRUSHED ASIDE PROVISIONS  
FOR THE SPECIALLY ELECTED MEMBERS AND DID NOT SEEM  
OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE  
SOUTH AFRICANS HAD TOLD SMITH THAT INSISTING ON 28  
MEMBERS WAS LUDICROUS. BOTHA HAD TOLD OWEN THIS DURING

THE NAMIBIA TALKS IN NEW YORK. MOREOVER WE KNOW, OWEN  
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SAID, THAT SMITH HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO SETTLE FOR  
LESS, IF ONLY THREE LESS. MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT THE 28  
WHITE SEATS MIGHT BE TRADED AWAY BY SMITH IN THE CONTEXT  
OF BRINGING NKOMO INTO THE AGREEMENT. MOOSE RETURNED  
TO THE ISSUE OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL. HE POINTED OUT  
THAT AS PRESENTLY STRUCTURED (IF IT INCLUDED CHIRAU)  
NKOMO AND MUGABE WOULD FIND THEMSELVES OUTNUMBERED TWO  
VOTES TO FOUR AND WOULD, THEREFORE, OPPOSE IT. OWEN  
ANSWERED THAT THE WAY OUT OF THE DIFFICULTY WAS TO GIVE  
NKOMO A PRE-EMINENT ROLE.

14. FURTHER DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON THE TEXT OF THE  
INVITATION AS TO WHETHER THE US AND UK SHOULD STATE  
THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE AAP OR WHETHER THIS WAS TOO  
RIGID A FORMULATION. OWEN SUGGESTED THAT THE UK AND US  
GOVERNMENTS WOULD SAY THAT THEY HAD PUT FORWARD A PLAN  
DESIGNED TO GIVE EFFECT TO BASIC PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE  
INVITE ALL THE PARTIES TO A MEETING. SECRETARY VANCE  
AGREED WITH THAT FORMULATION.

15. VANCE ASKED HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED TO NEGOTIATE  
PARTICIPATION. SHOULD WE GO DIRECTLY TO SALISBURY AND  
TO WHOM SHOULD WE SPEAK FIRST? OWEN SUGGESTED WE GO  
PRIVATELY TO FOURIE IN CONFIDENCE AS WE HAVE BEFORE.  
HE ASKED IF WE COULD GO TO NYERERE AND SOUTH AFRICA AT  
THE SAME TIME. VANCE SAID HE THOUGHT SO. WE OUGHT TO  
SEE NYERERE RIGHT AT THE OUTSET. LAKE ADDED THAT SINCE  
WE WERE SEEING NKOMO THE NEXT DAY, HAVING SOME REACTION  
FROM NYERERE IN GENERAL TERMS COULD BE IMPORTANT IN  
SOFTENING UP NKOMO'S RESISTANCE IN ATTENDING A MEETING.  
OWEN AGREED. HE ADDED HIS INCLINATION TO GO THROUGH  
THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO GET TO SMITH. MR. VANCE POINTED  
OUT THAT AS NYERERE HAD SUGGESTED THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE,  
IT WOULD NOT BE GOOD TO SPRING IT ON HIM WITHOUT WARNING.  
OWEN SAID WE MUST BE CAREFUL BECAUSE WE DID NOT WANT  
THE PROCESS TO COME UNSTUCK AS HAD HAPPENED WITH THE  
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AAP. THE FRONT LINE AND SOUTH AFRICANS ARE PRESSURE POINTS THROUGH WHICH WE MIGHT APPROACH THE PF AND SMITH. GRAHAM POINTED OUT THAT SUCH PRESSURE DOES GET THEIR BACKS UP AND LEAD TO RESISTANCE. VANCE INSISTED ON THE MERITS OF GOING FIRST AND QUICKLY TO NYERERE AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THEN PROMPTLY TO THE PARTIES.

16. OWEN ASKED ABOUT ATTENDANCE. IF WE GOT BOTH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND SMITH ON BOARD, THEN HE SUGGESTED WE COULD HAVE A CONFERENCE. MOOSE STRESSED THE BENEFITS OF GETTING A QUICK RESPONSE FROM NYERERE. HE SUGGESTED WE MIGHT GAIN SOME WORKING TIME BY MOVING THE NKOMO AND

MUGABE MEETING WITH VANCE TO FRIDAY MORNING. MR. VANCE POINTED OUT THAT HIS SCHEDULE WOULD NOT ALLOW THAT, ALTHOUGH HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MEET WITH THEM IN THE AFTERNOON. MR. VANCE SUMMED UP THE DECISION ON THIS POINT BY SAYING IT SEEMED FAIR TO HIM THAT WE SHOULD GO QUICKLY TO BOTH NYERERE AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND GET THEIR REACTIONS TO THE INVITATION, AND THAT WE SHOULD DO IT JOINTLY. OWEN AGREED.

17. OWEN ASKED WHEN VANCE COULD DEVOTE SOME TIME TO SUCH A MEETING. MR. VANCE SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE NEXT WEEK. AFTER REVIEWING HIS CALENDAR, MR. VANCE SUGGESTED MARCH 20, OR MARCH 16 AND 17. OWEN AGREED THOSE DATES WERE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. VANCE AND OWEN ALSO AGREED, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN ON A PROXIMITY BASIS, WE WOULD WAIT FOR REACTIONS BEFORE DECIDING ON THAT.

18. MOOSE RAISED THE QUESTION OF HOW TO RESPOND TO NYERERE IF HE ASKS IF THE AAP WERE THE BASIS OF THE NEW  
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INVITATION. MR. VANCE SAID WE WOULD REFER HIM TO THE TEXT OF THE INVITATION. LAKE ADDED THAT WE COULD SAY THE LANGUAGE OF THE INVITATION WAS FRAMED TO SHOW WE ARE STANDING BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AAP. OWEN THOUGHT WE SHOULD TELL NYERERE THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH ROOM FOR MANEUVERING AT THIS POINT. VANCE SAID WE SHOULD GET HIS REACTION. HE ADDED THAT FOLLOWING THAT WE COULD HAVE IVOR RICHARD ISSUE THE INVITATION IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

19. VANCE TURNED AGAIN TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO HOLD THE MEETING IN NEW YORK CITY OR ELSEWHERE. HE SUGGESTED ARDEN HOUSE, WHICH IS A LARGE, COMODIOUS PLACE OUTSIDE NEW YORK WITH FACILITIES FOR COMMUNICATIONS

AND ACCOMMODATIONS. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE DELEGATIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE LARGE AND TO NEED SEPARATE ACCOMMODATIONS. OWEN SUGGESTED THAT THE RHODESIAN TALKS BE HELD WHERE THE NAMIBIAN TALKS HAD BEEN CONVENED (USUN NEW YORK) AND MR. VANCE AGREED.

20. VANCE TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF UN TACTICS. GRAHAM SAID THE UK PROBABLY OUGHT NOT SPEAK. HELMAN POINTED OUT THAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG WAS IN NO HURRY TO SPEAK. OWEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE BEST APPROACH WAS FOR HIM TO RETURN DIRECTLY TO THE UK. HELMAN SUGGESTED THAT ONCE THE INVITATION HAD BEEN PUT OUT, PRESSURES AT THE UN WOULD BE REDUCED. OWEN ASKED IF WE GOT A FAVORABLE REACTION FROM NYERERE AND SOUTH AFRICA, WOULD WE THEN GO PUBLIC. VANCE SUGGESTED THAT WE WOULD FIRST CONVEY

THE INVITATION TO NKOMO, MUGABE, AND MUZOREWA AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE FRONT LINE. LAKE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DOING IT SERIATIM. WE SHOULD PLAN TO GO SOME HOURS AHEAD OF PUBLICATION TO THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. MR. VANCE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE SOME IDEA OF THE NATIONALISTS' REACTION BEFORE WE

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PUBLISH THE INVITATION.

21. OWEN ASSERTED THAT A CONFERENCE WITHOUT SMITH WOULD BE HOPELESS. VANCE SAID THAT WE COULD TELL HIM THAT IF HE COULD NOT ATTEND, HE SHOULD SEND A DEPUTY. LAKE POINTED OUT THAT A CONFERENCE WITHOUT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WAS ALSO USELESS. OWEN SAID THE HARDEST TO GET A FAVORABLE REACTION FROM WAS SMITH. OWEN AND VANCE AGREED THAT IF EITHER SMITH OR THE PF REFUSED THE INVITATION, THERE COULD BE NO CONFERENCE, AND GRAHAM SUGGESTED WE MAKE THAT POINT TO NYERERE. OWEN SAID THIS WAS ONE ADVANTAGE OF GOING THROUGH THE SOUTH AFRICANS WHO COULD HOLD SMITH TO ANY ACCEPTANCE; HE WAS SO SLIPPERY.

22. MOOSE SAID NYERERE'S RESPONSE WAS LIKELY TO BE THAT HE WAS WILLING TO DO HIS BEST BUT HE WOULD WANT TO KNOW IF THE BASIS OF THE INVITATION WAS THE AAP. OWEN SAID WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THIS WAS OUR POSITION, AS DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, AND IT WAS AN OPEN OFFER ON THE TABLE. VANCE AGREED WITH THAT.

23. LAKE RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE. HE ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD GO AHEAD IF ANY OF THE PARTIES REFUSED TO COME. VANCE AND OWEN AGREED THAT IF MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE AND THE PF ALL AGREE TO COME TO A MEETING, THE CONFERENCE COULD GO AHEAD. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, SMITH'S ATTENDANCE WAS NOT

NECESSARY.

24. VANCE ASKED ABOUT OBSERVERS. OWEN SUGGESTED THAT WE NOT ADMIT THEM INTO THE CONFERENCE ROOM. VANCE AGREED, AND HELMAN ADDED THAT THIS COULD BE HANDLED AS CONFIDENTIAL

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WITH THE NAMIBIA PROXIMITY TALKS BY HAVING A FREQUENT BRIEFING SESSION WITH THE FRONT LINE. MOOSE REMINDED THE GROUP THAT THE FRONT LINE HAD BEEN ANNOYED BY THEIR EXCLUSION FROM THE CONFERENCE AT FIRST IN MALTA. VANCE SAID HE WAS SOMEWHAT WORRIED ABOUT THE FRONT LINE PERM REPS IN NEW YORK AND WOULD PREFER SOME FOREIGN MINISTERS. THIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE SHOULD INVITE BOTHA FROM SOUTH AFRICA. VANCE SAID WE SHOULD LEAVE IT UP TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS. IF THEY WANT TO BE THERE, THAT WAS UP TO THEM.

25. OWEN POINTED OUT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO CALL THE MEETING A CONFERENCE BUT SIMPLY SAY WE WERE INVITING THE PARTIES TO MEET, AND VANCE AGREED.

26. TURNING TO THE ISSUE WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE, OWEN ASKED WHAT POINTS WE COULD SUGGEST TO MARRY THE POSITIONS TOGETHER. LAKE REVIEWED A MEMO PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT WHICH OUGHT TO FIND COMMON GROUND ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES.

27. OWEN AGAIN RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE SHOULD STAY ON IN WASHINGTON OR RETURN TO THE UK. HE PREFERRED GOING. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, IT WAS AGREED THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO THE UK.

28. IN CONSIDERING THE POSITION AT THE UN, MOOSE RAISED THE QUESTION OF INVOLVING TRANZANIAN AMBASSADOR SALIM IN OUR EFFORT. OWEN SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD DO BETTER TO STICK TO THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS. HELMAN SAID SALIM MIGHT HELP REDUCE AFRICAN RESISTANCE IN ALLOWING MUZOREWA TO SPEAK. OWEN ASKED IF WE WOULD NOT HAVE THE VOTES TO PUT THAT ACROSS. HE SAID HE FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS AND LAKE AGREED IT WAS NOT MERELY A MATTER OF POLITICS BUT OF PRINCIPLE. OWEN SAID HE WOULD EVEN SPLIT WITH THE US ON THIS ISSUE  
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BECAUSE IT WOULD BE THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE UN.

29. OWEN AGAIN RETURNED TO SOME OF THE ISSUES WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING REPRE-

SENTATION IN PARLIAMENT, CONTROL OF THE MILITARY FORCES, UN INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTIONS, AND AMNESTY. HE POINTED OUT THAT SMITH WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE "BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES FORMULA" AND WOULD RESIST A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. LAKE AGREED THAT THE MILITARY PROBLEM WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT. MOOSE SAID THAT WAS TRUE UNLESS NKOMO ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT. A FURTHER ISSUE MIGHT BE RAISED IF THE GOVERNMENT COUNCIL WERE ENDOWED WITH LEGISLATIVE POWERS. LAKE SUGGESTED, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT IN REVIEWING THE ISSUES DURING THE MEETING, OUR APPROACH WOULD BE TO POINT OUT THE SUGGESTIONS IN THE AAP AND IN THE INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS TO COVER A PARTICULAR ISSUE. WE COULD POINT TO THE DISAGREEMENTS AND ASK FOR THE PARTIES' SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO BRIDGE THE GAP. WE NEED TO FRAME AN AGENDA COVERING THESE KEY QUESTIONS.

30. OWEN RETURNED TO THE SITUATION AT THE UN. HE SAID THAT THE MOST URGENT PROBLEM WAS HOW TO HANDLE VOTING

ON THE AFRICAN RESOLUTION. HE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR THE BRITISH VIEW THAT THE AFRICAN RESOLUTION WAS MANDATORY. IF THE UK ABSTAINED, THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE A VERY POWERFUL EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 OF THE PRESENT DRAFT. MOREOVER, PARAGRAPH 2 WOULD PREVENT ANY FORM OF RELATIONSHIP WITH ANYTHING OUT OF SALISBURY. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO COME TO ANY CONFIDENTIAL

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DECISION ON SUCH A QUESTION UNTIL AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, AN ELECTION, AND INDEPENDENCE. HELMAN ARGUED THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT MANDATORY. OWEN INSISTED THAT IT WOULD BE HARMFUL TO FIND OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF HAVING CONDEMNED THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. HE ARGUED FOR A STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE FROM BOTH THE US AND UK. THE UK FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT OPERATIVE PARAS 3 AND 4 OF THE PRESENT DRAFT.

31. HELMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE RESOLUTION MIGHT NOT COME TO A VOTE IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THERE WOULD BE AS MANY AS SIX ABSTENTIONS, ESPECIALLY INCLUDING ALL OF THE WESTERN FIVE. THAT WOULD WEAKEN THE FORCE OF ANY RESOLUTION. OWEN REPEATED THAT HE MUST MAKE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF VOTE, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD GET INTO TACTICS OF REDRAFTING VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS. VANCE AGREED.

32. MR. VANCE ASKED OWEN IN LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSION, WHAT WAS HIS SCHEDULE. OWEN SAID HE PLANNED TO RETURN TO THE UK THAT EVENING. THAT WOULD COOL THE SITUATION AT THE UN, AND WITH MUGABE AND NKOMO. MR. VANCE ASKED ABOUT THE

PRESS, AND OWEN SUGGESTED THAT HE AND VANCE SEE THEM TOGETHER. MR. VANCE SUGGESTED WE DRAFT AN AGREED STATEMENT, AS MOST OF THE PRESS WOULD HAVE PULLED OUT BY THAT TIME. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH THE DRAFTING OF THE FOLLOWING JOINT STATEMENT, AS WELL AS THE REFERENCED TELEGRAM.

33. BEGIN TEXT OF STATEMENT: SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN MET THIS AFTERNOON WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND THEN HELD FURTHER CONVERSATIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH THE QUESTION OF RHODESIA. THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL JOINTLY CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT AMONG ALL THE PARTIES, IN ACCORD-  
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ANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD: FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, A TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE AND INDEPENDENCE, AND RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF ALL THE CITIZENS OF AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. END TEXT. VANCE

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**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 10  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** STATE 060429  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3166409  
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**Subject:** RHODESIA: BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN VISIT TO WASHINGTON  
**TAGS:** PDEV, PDIP, RH, US, UK, (OWEN, DAVID)  
**To:** LONDON GABORONE MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014